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1 Koopman’s book revolves around the notion of transition, which he proposes is one of
the central ideas of the pragmatist tradition but one which had not previously been
fully  articulated  yet  nevertheless  shapes  the  pragmatist  attitude  in  philosophy.
Transition, according to Koopman, denotes “those temporal structures and historical
shapes in virtue of which we get from here to there” (2). One of the consequences of
transitionalism is the understanding of critique and inquiry as historical processes. The
term transitionalism is the term of art Koopman chooses for identifying the historicist
attitude of the pragmatist mode of thinking. With his book, Koopman aims at bridging
the gap he sees between the classical  –  mostly Deweyan and Jamesian – version of
pragmatism and the second wave of pragmatism – in particular, the Rortyan version.
The banner under which Koopman proposes to understand pragmatism as a unified
stream going from Peirce to Brandom (via James, Dewey, Rorty, and Putnam) is that of
philosophy  as  “meliorist  cultural  criticism.”  A  definition,  we  should  note,  which
perfectly suit – and this is by no means by chance – James’ and Rorty’s philosophies.
Transitionalism so conceived,  in fact,  is  not  simply a  philosophy or  metaphysics  of
history, nor in the Foucauldian vein, an ontology of history. Transitionalism express
rather the conception of temporality implicit in the melioristic attitude shared by the
pragmatist  tradition:  pragmatism,  to  that  extent,  is  transitional  because  it  is
Colin Koopman, Pragmatism as transition. Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey...
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, I-1/2 | 2009
1
melioristic: it sees time as the sphere where transformations can be brought about and
improvement achieved.
2 The aim of the book is  twofold:  firstly,  to articulate the concept of transitionalism;
secondly, to show how this theme runs through the pragmatist tradition and the extent
to which it can bind together all its scattered strands. In this vein, Koopman offers us
sketches of transitional epistemology, ethics,  politics,  and, as an open conclusion, a
hint  towards  a  rapprochement  of  pragmatist  transitionalism  and  the  genealogical
tradition.
3 Transitionalism as Koopman proposes us to conceive it, is built upon the melioristic
intuition, that Koopman urges us to acknowledge as the motivating inspiration of all
the pragmatist  tradition.  The transformative attitude implicit  in meliorism requires
that we operate in a frame that is that of intentional and directed change: from worse
to better. If we see pragmatism in this guise, it is clear why Koopman urges us to gather
all pragmatist efforts under the label of transitionalism. Pragmatism as transitionalist
places us in the middle of things (or better, of situations) and, from that vantage point,
urges us to think comparatively: in a melioristic perspective, the focus is never on what
is true, good, or just, but on how a present situation can be improved: how a belief can
be made sounder, how a moral situation bettered, how the level of justice improved.
Meliorism, to this extent, generalizes upon Dewey’s ethical (but broadly philosophical)
maxim that “growth is the only end in itself”, or James’ “life is in the transition” (this
last quoted by Koopman, 12). Any fallibilistic epistemology, to that extent, might be
termed  ‘transitional’,  as  well  as  any  ethical,  political  (or  other)  philosophy  that
conceives human processes of development as being open ended.
4 According to the transitionalist approach, “philosophy is best understood as a theory
and practice  of  hopeful  cultural  criticism” (16).  This  cultural  criticism presupposes
hope as the motivating force: we engage in criticism because we hope that in that way
we  will  ameliorate  the  present  situation.  To  that  extent,  the  melioristic  approach
presupposes an attitude of hope, which in turn is tied to pluralism (multiple worlds
exist) and humanism (humans contribute to the worlds they inhabit). The world is in
transformation,  and humans take part  to this  process and,  to a  certain extent,  can
control it. Pragmatism is committed to the thesis that we can create better world and
selves.  This,  according  to  Colin  Koopman,  is  the  central  thesis  of  the  pragmatist
tradition.
5 Koopman – and this is one of the most important thesis of his book – believes that this
ground offers an ecumenical perspective capable of bringing all the different strands of
pragmatism (classical and neo) under a new ‘third wave’ synthesis.
6 The  second chapter  retraces  the  transitionalist  theme to  most  of  the  classical  and
contemporary pragmatists, including thinkers such as Peirce and Quine. The aim is to
show  the  extent  to  which  this  theme  is present  in  the  pragmatist  tradition,  even
outside  those  figure  whose  transitionalist  commitment  is  clear.  Transitionalism  is
originally developed by Emerson and pass successively on to James and Dewey. This, in
Koopman intentions, should count as a demonstration of the fact that the category of
transitionalism  can  sustain  the  theoretical  work  needed  in  order  to  bring  all  the
pragmatist  tradition under a  single  umbrella.  While  interesting,  this  reconstruction
underscores the shaping force of evolutionism, whose inspiration is explicitly at work
in any deweyan (and many peircean) attempts at defining the temporal structure of
human experience. Transition, change, novelty (52) are also central categories of any
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evolutionary  approach.  To  better  defend  the  transitional  paradigm,  more  detailed
historical analysis would be required in order to distinguish the melioristic from the
evolutionary theme in the different philosophies. Moreover, as it will become clear in
the  following  chapters,  the  commitment  of  the  pragmatists  to  the  melioristic
assumption  is  so  differentiated  in  tone  and  degree  that  when  Koopman  tries  to
articulate its epistemological, ethical, and political implications, he will be obliged to
get rid of Peirce and Quine, to set aside Putnam and Margolis, and grossly misinterpret
Dewey, to the extent that at the end of his journey what remains in the hands of the
third wave pragmatists is the affinity among James and Rorty as thinkers of hope.
7 That things would have gone that way the reader can feel it since the first chapter,
where Koopman lay out as the epistemological pillar of his project is James’ theory of
truth. I will only remark in passing that James’ insights into epistemology could have
been defended more easily if they were discussed in a way not so totally oblivious of a
century of speculation in logic and epistemology. This starting point, inevitably, drives
Koopman to a gross misunderstanding of Dewey and Peirce epistemologies. He not only
dismisses Peirce as an inspiring source of his transitional pragmatism (and this brings
to  zero  his  chances  to  “to  integrate  what  is  best  in  the  two  distinctive  waves  of
pragmatist thought that have preceded it,” 3), but his appraisal of Dewey is paid at the
too high cost of getting rid of his epistemology in order to make of him that critic of
culture that Rorty wanted him to be. Many scholars will be astonished in reading that
for Dewey “truth might be but one of the names for our self-salving” (43). But more is
to come for those who take Peirce seriously and those who do not read Dewey after
Rorty. A not small portion of people interested in pragmatism, I believe.
8 The chapter devoted to the articulation of a transitional epistemology opens with the
acknowledgment  that  one  of  the  main  epistemological  innovations  developed  by
pragmatism  concerns  the  introduction  of  temporality  into  epistemic  relations.
According to pragmatism, knowledge is conceptualized as a historical relation between
former  expectations  and  subsequent  consequences  (practical  eventualities).  It  is  a
definition  broad  enough  to  encompass  pragmatists  from  Peirce  to  Rorty,  and  it  is
limited  enough  to  usefully  describe  the  pragmatist  epistemology  as  opposed  to
different epistemological projects. Our practical engagements with the world stand as
starting  point  of  the  epistemological  work.  The  historical,  sociological  and
anthropological conditions that qualify a given context are considered the inescapable
reference  of  all  epistemic  acts.  Then  Koopman  accomplishes  a  further  step  that
reproduces the divide between those pragmatists that consider normativity a necessary
part of epistemology (here I would list Peirce, Dewey, Margolis, Putnam) and those that
consider that historicity replaces normativity (here I would list James and Rorty). Both
camps  (at  least  some  of  their  participants)  will  acknowledge  the  inescapability  of
contextual elements in the production of knowledge as a temporal process, but while
the first group will urge that this fact changes our understanding of normativity – a
normativity free of universalistic pretences, the second would simply dismiss the need
for a normative enterprise. Claiming that “epistemic success and failure are internally
attributed wholly within practices” (111, my emphasis), Koopman sides explicitly with
the second group. It should be noted that none of the philosophers I put in the first
group  would  agree  to  such  a  claim,  unless  specifications  are  offered  that  grant  a
specific  place for  normativity.  As  a  paradigmatic  exemplification of  his  transitional
epistemology,  Koopman  offers  the  sociological  work  of  Pierre  Bourdieu,  whose
conception of practice is surely in line with the pragmatist outlook, but whose work is
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surely not a pertinent source for epistemology. Koopman is well aware of the objections
that even pragmatists (of the first stripe) could move to his claim. He firstly reminds us
that  pragmatist  epistemology refuses  the  spectator  theory of  knowledge and,  in  so
doing,  reclaimed  the  right  of  practice  in  the  field  of  epistemology.  Overcoming
correspondence, coherence and proceduralist conceptions of truth, pragmatism paves
the  way  for  this  epistemological  role  of  practice.  This  surely  accounts  for  the
epistemological revolution brought about by pragmatism and constitute the common
ground  of  most  of  the  epistemological  outlooks  that  traceable  to  pragmatism.
Historical,  sociological,  and  anthropological  approaches  are  required  in  order  to
reconstruct  the  different  ways  human  beings  have  developed  in  order  to  fix  their
beliefs. This, again, is a claim that most pragmatists would accept, and can be put at the
basis of a general pragmatist epistemology. But the question remains open whether and
how we could discriminate between competing ways (methods) of belief fixation. It is
precisely on this point that the pragmatist tree splits in different and non reconcilable
directions and that Koopman has to take side: he cannot have both in his group Peirce
and James,  Dewey and Rorty,  Margolis  and Bourdieu.  To this extent,  his  transitional
epistemology  cannot  function  as  a  pragmatist  koiné,  and  is  forced  to  reproduce  –
instead of solving – those philosophical conflicts that since Peirce’s and James’ time
characterize the philosophical conversation inside pragmatism. Koopman is fully right
in  reminding  us  that  the  pragmatist  epistemology  was  born  “in  the  crucible  of
probabilities” (113). But we should not forget that probable reasoning gives rise to two
different strategies:  the betting strategy that Koopman adopts in order to define the
pragmatist-transitionalist conception of inquiry, and the abductive strategy, according
to which rather than betting we accurately assess arguments, compare results, engage
with experience. A bet, like the Pascal wager so dear to James takes place where reason
offers no more evidence, while abduction takes place precisely as an act of reason. The
second  is  controlled,  the  first  relies  on  will.  Beliefs,  Peirce  and  Dewey  said,  are
hypotheses, not bets. The epistemological and practical difference stands here as an
irreducible divide. Of course, bets are not blind, but there are nevertheless limitations
to the validity of the metaphor, and words are never chosen by chance.
9 A similar strategy drives his effort at defining a transitional approach to ethics.  He
opens his chapter on this topic with a notion that some would consider an oxymoron
and others would refuse with force: that of a perfectionist pragmatism. The background
of this approach is given by the idea that the dominant moral doctrines of deontology
and  teleology  should  be  overcome  and  that  cannot  be  done  by  virtue  ethics.
Perfectionist pragmatism is advanced precisely as a solution to this diagnosis.
10 Claiming a perfectionist tone for pragmatism, Koopman sides obviously against Cavell,
whose  understanding  of  pragmatism  and  perfectionism  posits  an  incompatibility
between  the  two  terms.  According  to  Koopman,  such  an  understanding  is  wrong
because based upon a reductive conception of pragmatism (the same he will  use in
interpreting Dewey). Koopman strongest argument for advocating a perfectionist tone
for pragmatism is to rely on its melioristic attitude: meliorism is, for Koopman, a sure
sign  of  perfectionism,  as  both  share  a  tension  towards  perfecting  the  self.  In  this
enterprise, Koopman assigns to James rather than Dewey the leading role. In following
Cavell, Koopman considers perfectionism as not refusing but rather including teleology
and deontology. The same, Koopman claims, is true of pragmatist ethics. Although it is
not very clear why reference to will and pleasure should imply the endorsement of
deontology and teleology, Koopman clearly identifies in the process of perfecting and
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in the refusal of a rule-based ethics a common theme of pragmatism and perfectionism.
In James’ notion of effort Koopman finds another perfectionist notion: while pragmatist
meliorism does not necessarily depend upon an ethic of the effort, the Jamesian version
proposes  such a  connection,  and sides  Emerson’s  perfectionism in  emphasizing the
crucial importance of individual acts of discontinuity in facing radical moral situations.
On this side, too, Koopman’s proposal is more Jamesian than Deweyan, so confirming
an interpretive line joining Emerson, James, and Rorty. Although I am not sure that
Cavell  would  be  satisfied  by  Koopman’s  answer  (acknowledging  the  necessity  to
combine acceptance of the given conditions – principle of moral pleasure – and will to
transform them – principle of will – does not seem to satisfy adequately Cavell’s criteria
for  perfectionism),  the  articulation of  these  two criteria  offers  a  starting  point  for
defining a progressive and melioristic attitude in ethics such as that can be found at the
bottom of some pragmatist philosophies.
11 The chapter on politics follow the same scheme that structures that on ethics, only
replacing  deontology  and  teleology  with  utopianism  and  dystopianism  as  the
contemporary political philosophies that pragmatism is supposed to replace. Among
the  rationalistic  utopian  approaches,  Koopman  includes  Rawls’.  Among  the
irrationalistic,  dystopian thinkers,  Koopman lists  Benjamin,  Heidegger,  Derrida,  and
Zizek.
12 This frame is meant at drawing an opposition between over-rationalistic approaches
that disregard the specific traits of political reality in order to follow only the idealities
of reason, and irrationalistic and pessimistic approaches that focus exclusively on a
reality considered as irremediably compromised with power and incapable of offering
any reason for hope. The pragmatist move consists here, as in the field of ethics, in
delineating an intermediate  path,  capable  of  bringing ideality  and reality  to  terms.
Pragmatism so conceived, in fact holds “that political reason is always situated within a
context but in such a way as to provide the resources for its own improvement” (164).
Surprisingly, Koopman tells us that this move approaches pragmatism to conservative
thinking, namely to those conservatives “who articulate evolutionary, developmental,
and situate conceptions of political practice.” This is puzzling at the highest degree: not
only  there  is  no  valid  reason  for  associating  conservative  with  evolutionary  and
developmental arguments in political theory, on the contrary. But the association of
pragmatism and conservatism is even more surprising, especially as this is  justified
because  of  a  supposedly  common  engagement  with  reformism  instead  as
revolutionism. That “we ought not flee from political  reality in order to engage an
ethical  perspective”  (164)  seems  to  be  at  least  a  very  inventive  conception  of
conservatism.  Nevertheless,  if  we  leave  aside  this  very  unhappy  categorization  of
political theories, what remains is a steady affirmation of a contextual principle. We are
brought  again  back  to  that  primacy  of  practice  that  characterizes  pragmatist
philosophies. Drawing on Dewey’s political philosophy, Koopman proposes to define a
melioristic approach to politics “as the improvement of political realities on the basis
of resources already available within the very realities on which we are working” (167).
Here Koopman re-proposes the model of an absolute immanence, of a pure historicity
in which situation, practice, or context cannot and need not be transcended in order to
successfully act inside them. Situations and every kind of context are considered to be
already  provided  of  those  normative  criteria  which  are  required  in  order  to
discriminate  growth  from  its  opposite:  “we  need  not,  nor  could  we  ever  hope  to,
transcend the  present  situations  in  which we find ourselves  in  order  to  locate  the
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resources we need for meliorating that situation” (168). A definition that, once again,
would better  suit  Rorty’s  dismissal  of  epistemology and James’  will  to  believe than
Dewey’s  affirmation  of  the  normative  requirements  of  inquiry.  The  following
paragraph  traces  parallels  between  this  melioristic  conception  of  politics  in
pragmatism and analogous  conceptions  in  Williams’,  Foucault’s,  Young’s,  and  Sen’s
political philosophies, underlying their common endorsement of the principle of the
primacy  of  practice.  Of  these,  the  melioristic  reading  of  Williams’  philosophy  is
particularly insightful.
13 In his concluding chapter, Koopman proceeds to trace a pathway aimed at bringing
pragmatism near to genealogical thinking, on the basis of their common usage of the
knowledge of the past for gaining guidance in the present and in the future. The use of
history recommended by Koopman to pragmatism is genealogical in sort: it is a use of
history aimed at understanding the processes through which we have become what we
presently are. We are not far, as soon Koopman will explain, from Foucault’s project of
an  historical  ontology.  The  pragmatist  paradigm  chosen  in  order  to  highlight
pragmatism’s compatibility with genealogy is Dewey’s reconstructive model of inquiry.
Koopman  interprets  Dewey’s  injunction  to  place  inquiry  into  the  context  of
problematic  situations  as  a  call  for  philosophers  to  recur  to  social  and  historical
sciences in order to deepen their understanding of practices on which they reflect. He
completes  his  interpretation  of  reconstruction  as  the  core  of  deweyan pragmatism
adding  that  it  proceeds  on  the  basis  of  resources  already  present  in  the  situation
(principle of absolute immanence) and is intrinsically an ameliorative process. He then
proceed, on the basis of a model he has applied in former chapters, to contrast this
conception of thinking to more traditional conceptions – here what he terms realism
and idealism, in order to show that pragmatism constitutes a third way that draws
upon their resources but in order to frame a new conception. This is the only place
where Koopman deeply tackles Dewey’s philosophy, engaging in a critical assessment
of Dewey’s theory of inquiry. This last is heavily criticised for not having adequately
explained how problematic situations are generated, because of an exclusive focus on
their resolution. In the several pages devoted to Dewey, we find lots of very trenchant
judgments such as: “Dewey simply had too little to say about how we might fashion
forms of inquiry that help us bring the right kinds of problems into focus” (199). This is
a bit too fast, especially as what is offered as evidence for such a critique are only few
quotes disparagingly taken from different texts. Koopman should have better taken a
deeper  look  at  Dewey’s  pedagogical  and  political  writings,  where  we  find  accurate
diagnosis of obstacles, constraints, causes that hinders political and educative practice.
Or to his conception of the qualitative as the process through which the indeterminate
situation becomes determinate. It is certainly true that Dewey did not provide detailed
social analysis of reality, but this was not the focus of his research. It is astonishing that
in his search for a general theoretical paradigm, Koopman does not see the fruitfulness
of Dewey’s theory of inquiry as an abstract description of the general process of how
problems arise, are perceived, transformed through inquiry, faced, solved. His criticism
of his conception of the notion of situation is based upon a very reductive reading of
his  texts  (Burke,  Dewey’s  new  logic  showed  that  in  great  details  fifteen  years  ago,
Sleepers, The Necessity of Pragmatism more than twenty years ago). Then, of course, the
role  of  other  traditions  and  approaches  in  the  analysis  of  psycho-socio-political-
economical-gender,  etc.  factors  that  contribute in shaping problematic  situations is
certainly of great and irreplaceable value. In this sense, and hopefully, sixty years of
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philosophy  and  social  sciences  has  not  passed  in  vain.  The  same  treatment,  not
surprisingly,  is  then  offered  to  Peirce,  whose  epistemology  is  too  easily  dismissed
without  even  considering  the  potentialities  implied  not  only  in  the  doubt-belief
paradigm, but even in Peirce’s complex conception of the practice of research and of
how subtle and complex is the experience of doubt in different forms of inquiry. To say
that for Dewey and Peirce doubt is “an unanalyzable given state of mind” or a form of
givenness that “do not stand in need of  explication,  justification,  interpretation,  or
inferential articulation” (205) is simply a proposition so off the mark that no Peirce of
Dewey scholar can take seriously.
14 In the end, which is the global contribution of Koopman’s project to the advancement
of pragmatism? A first remark is that, his statements notwithstanding, his account of
pragmatism  is  decidedly  not  ecumenical  but  steadily  biased  towards  a  Jamesian-
Rortyan understanding.  While it  is  pretty clear that his  melioristic  and transitional
concerns  fit  poorly  with  Peirce’s  vision  (and  practice)  of  philosophy,  and with  the
epistemological  outlooks  it  inspired  (and  which  are  still  living  and  well  inside  the
pragmatist tradition). It also tends to deeply misread Dewey, bringing him selectively
towards the Rortyan reading. One of the unhappy consequences of this rehearsing of
Rorty’s  interpretation  of  Dewey  is  a  misunderstanding  of  the  force  and  novelty  of
Dewey’s epistemology and the rehearsal of a interpretative canon that prioritizes the
image of  Dewey critic  of  culture and thinker of  reform and reconstruction over an
image  of  Dewey  where  his  evolutionary  and  epistemological  sensibility  find  their
proper place (Dewey as a theorist of rationality, as the inventor of an original theory of
judgment, as bringing science into the evolutionary mould, etc.). This is a move many
other have accomplished – especially after Rorty’s lesson, but is a move that has also
been deeply criticised and that I think should be resisted. For these and similar reasons,
his  proposed  definition  of  the  pragmatist  movement  under  the  label  of
“transitionalism”  is  too  narrow  for  his  scope.  But  could  have  it  been  otherwise?
Bringing Emerson and Peirce (under Rortyan auspices)  under the same umbrella  is
simply a too hard task, unless the chosen umbrella is so broad to become irrelevant.
According to Peirce and (to a great extent) Dewey, philosophy is simply NOT a critique
of culture, although philosophers could (and for Dewey probably should) engage ALSO
in the critique of culture.
15 And this  is  the second risk that  Koopman enters:  his  transitional  philosophy,  aptly
inspired by non pragmatist thinkers such as Iris Marion Young and Michel Foucault, is
in a way too broad to serve the purpose: as a kind of historicism, transitionalism apply
to too many thinkers to be aptly used for defining a single tradition of thought, i.e.
pragmatism (be it its third wave). If, following Koopman, we consider that “philosophy
is best understood as a theory and practice of hopeful cultural criticism” (16), and if we
define meliorism as the will to contribute to the “epistemic, ethic and political realities
in  which  we  find  ourselves  flowing”,  which  philosopher,  scientist,  or  practitioner
would deny to adhere to the melioristic claim? Is not any research by default engaged
in bettering the epistemic condition of his discipline? His not any practitioner or socio-
political theorist engaged – at least provisionally – in improving the ethical, social, and
political conditions of his time? Wouldn’t we say that even of non pragmatist thinkers
such  as  John Rawls?  Meliorism and transitionalism so  conceived  are  probably  best
conceived as the signs of our time: a time of increased degrees of transformation, of
generalized  experimental  and  fallibilistic  approaches  to  reality,  of  extraordinarily
shortened  life-cycles  for  any  product,  idea,  institution  produced  by  humans.
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Pragmatism,  with  the  works  of  Dewey and James,  has  surely  been one  of  the  first
philosophical  traditions to interpret this new configuration of human societies (but
let’s not forget Marx’s famous claim that in capitalist societies “all that is solid melts
into airs”). In this, pragmatism was of course indebted to the fluxive interpretation of
nature  offered  by  the  Darwinian  revolution.  After  that,  many  philosophers  and
scientists have attempted to articulate this evolutionary and progressive outlook in
different guise, so giving rise to a transitional way of thinking (surely in tone with a
society increasingly based on dynamical processes of change at all levels).
16 For these reasons, I think that the ecumenical project of overcoming the opposition of
classic  and  neo  pragmatist  in  the  ‘new  synthesis’  of  a  third  wave  of  transitional
pragmatism fails: we hardly needed Koopman to acknowledge the similarities between
James and Rorty, and the debate between those that consider Rorty a follower of Dewey
and those that consider him a ‘traitor’ won’t be close by this book. Moreover, there will
be no ‘peace’ as he puts it,  simply leaving Peirce (and the part of Dewey’s thinking
much indebted to him) outside the group.  What Koopman proposes here as a  ‘new
synthesis,’ is probably no more that the furthering of a fruitful and well established line
of interpretation in the pragmatist tradition, going from Emerson to Koopman himself
via  James,  McDermott,  Rorty,  Stuhr  and  many  other  classical  and  contemporary
philosophers. Along this line, Koopman’s is surely an interesting book that pushes the





Colin Koopman, Pragmatism as transition. Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey...
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, I-1/2 | 2009
8
